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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
. 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of / 
EM~IA G. BUTfARS, ( 
Deceased. J 
Case No. 1945 
Proponent and 
Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Trial 
Court entered on November 15, 1952, admitting the Will 
of Emma G. Buttars, to probate, nothwithstanding the 
verdict of the Jury. The jury return~d its special verict 
on November 5, 1952, in which it found that the said will 
was not procured by undue influence or fraud, but found 
that on the date said will was executed on March 22, 1945, . 
she was not of a sound and disposing mind. 
The trial court no doubt based its judgment upon the 
undisputed evidence, as testified by both the attending 
witnesses, that Emma G. Buttars, unas.sisted, directed how 
she wanted her will made and the lack of any evidence of 
insanity. Both attesting witnesses testified that in their 
opinion Emma G. Buttars, on the date she made her will 
was mentally competent and had testamentary capacity. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Whenever reference is made herein to the pleadings, 
judgment or the testimony, it will be the record number 
made at bottom of each page by the court clerk. The 
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facts as detailed on pages 2 and 3 of appellants brief 
are in the main correctly stated, except we submit that 
their is no evidence that Wallace Buttars, who is named 
as executor in the will, took advantage of his mother. 
Counsel states (Br. 3) that decedent kept her holdings 
intact until conveyance and transfers commencing six 
days after will was made. These deeds did not necessarily 
affect her holdings since she retained a life estate, and 
therefore, enjoyed the income from the property until her 
demise. (Con. Ex. 21, 23, 24. ) And this income is re-
flected in her bank accounts. (R. 137.) And moreover, 
she retained title to most of her real property and also the 
bank accounts as appears from petition to probate will. 
( R. 1-4.) Counsel states ( Br. 3) that prior to date of will, 
Mrs. Buttars wanted to treat all of the children equally. 
This no doubt explains why she gave his children, each 
one dollar, because as she stated in the will, Dan had failed 
to repay his loan, evidenced by ( Exs. 2 and 3.) 
We cannot agree with statement of facts as related 
on pages 4 and 5 of appellanf s brief. These statements 
are at variance with the testimony of disinterested wit-
nesses. From an examination of the will it is interesting 
to note that testatrix could and did remember the death 
of her son, Dan, and could and did remember the names 
of his children because she accurately detailed them to 
Atttd"ney Daines. ( R. 5, 42) and she had no one to assist 
her memory, ( R. 38, 39) nor did she have a written mem-
orandum to assist her. ( R. 41.) She recited in her will 
that her son "Daniel D. Buttars" was deceased ( R. 5) and 
noted the difference in his name (middle initial) with that 
of her deceased husband, Daniel Buttars. 
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Her n1ind was not confused, nor was her mind or 
body deteriorated to the extent, that she was incompetent 
to make a will. The testimony of both attesting witnesses 
is that Mrs. Buttars, unassisted, supplied the information 
from which the will was prepared. ( R. 37-39.) She also 
had the note and mortgage (Con. Exs. 2 and 3) with her 
at the time and, left said documents and the will with 
Mr. Daines for safe keeping, and he retained them con-
tinuously until after her demise. ( R. 46, 335. ) 
There is an apparent error in the Reporter's transcript 
(~. 204, line 8) in the use of the word "incompetent," or 
m: the use of the same word by the cross examiner - and 
this is cleared up ( R. 205) where the witness, Melvin 
Buttars, admitted that he had signed a petition to probate 
the will (Pro. Ex. B) on the grounds that his mother, 
Emma G. Buttars, was mentally competent to make the 
will, Pro. Ex. t;t;A") ( R. 205. ) 
The apparent confusion on question of ~e ownership 
of turkeys (Br. 5) is in the ~ind of the witness Melvin H. 
Buttars, and not in the mind of the testatrix ( R. 201) for 
here the witness expresses only his own opinion as to the 
nature of the ownership. Mter all, Wallace was a tenant 
on her land. Counsel cites the testimony of Maybell 
Griffiths, as authority for the fact that testatrix did not 
know what property she possessed ( Br. 5.) · This witness 
testified that the time she was referring to was when Mrs. 
Buttars was sick in 1944 ( R. 237) and in 1952, but nothing 
is said about 1945, when the will was made. And more-
over,. this was another of the witnesses who signed and 
authorized a petition to admit the same will to probate, 
but asked the court to appoint her brother Melvin as ad-
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ministrator with will annexed, and she testified, {referring 
to said petition (Proponent's Exhibit No. B) - "Q. And 
on the day you signed this, about the 23rd day of July, 
1952, you asked the court to probate this will as the last 
will and testament of your mother? A. Yes. Q. In which 
it states she's of sound and disposing mind and memory. 
That's the petition you signed, was it not? A. It looks 
like it. ( R. 253) ." And notwithstanding, the contestants 
attempted to discredit their mother and grandmother for 
as long as twelve years before her death, ~11 of the testi-
mony of the disinterested witnesses produced by propon-
ents, is to the effect that to and including March, 1951, 
she was physically able to care for herself, and her mind 
was alert for a woman of her age. ( 266-330.) Dr. Randall, 
her attending physician testified that her mind was sound 
until March of 1952. ( R. 294-296. ) 
Wallace Buttars, testified that he had no knowledge 
of provisions of the will and that he took no part in the 
making of the same. On page 393 of the record Wallace 
testified - "Q. I'll ask you whether or not you had any-
thing to do with the making of the will, or suggesting, or 
anything at all to do with it. A. I never did." And he 
also testified - Q. Did you have anything to do or did 
you accompany your mother at any time when she went 
into the First Security Bank and bought those bonds and 
put them in her box? A. No., not unless she came to 
Logan with me and done it when I wasn't around. I may 
have brought her to Logan, but I was never with her when 
she made any of those bonds at all." R. 394.) 
Then on page 14 of appellant's brief, counsel states 
that the witnesses who were brothers and sisters of Wal-
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lace, all testified as to their mother's testamentary inca-
pacity. We have pointed out previously that every one 
of these witnesses also were parties to two cross petitions 
(Proponent's Exs. "B and C)" to the lower court to admit 
the will to probate, but asking that Melvin, be appointed 
Administrator with will annexed. Condonation of this 
conduct would amount to perpetrating a fraud on our 
Courts, and again we stress the fact that the jury found 
that there was no fraud, no undue influence in the execu-
tion of the will, and in view of these findings we submit 
that they bar any possible holding to the effect that the 
testatrix was of unsound mind at the date of execution of 
the will. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The findings and fudgment of the court, 
admitting the last will and testament of Emma G. Buttars, 
deceased, to probate, nothwithstanding the verdict of the 
fury, are supported by competent and uncontradicted 
evidence. 
There is direct, positive, and uncontradicted evidence 
that on March 22, 1945, the decedent, Emma G. Buttars, 
caused her last will and testament to be prepared by At-
torney Newell G. Daines. (R. 35, 37.) On that occasion 
she went to his office, alone and unassisted, and furnished 
the information necessary to prepare the will. ( R. 39). 
And upon completion thereof, and after it was read to her, 
she subscribed her name to the will in the presence of 
Attorney Daines and his stenographer Lois Schenk, and 
at her request and in her presence and in the presence of 
each other, they subscribed the will as attesting witnesses, 
and she then and there declared to them that it was her 
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last will and testament. ( R. 39, 59.) The will was then 
left with Attorney Daines, from March 22, 1945, until after 
her demise which occurred on July 1, 1952. And it was 
not changed or modified in any respect. 
In re Carr's will, 256 Pac. 580, the Supreme Court 
of Oregon stated: 
"In determining the mental capacity of the testator 
at the time of making the will, great weight is to be 
given to the testtmony of the subscribing witnesses. 
They have the opportunity to observe the mental con-
dition and all the surrounding circumstnces at the 
time of the execution of the will." 
As further proof of the fact that Emma G. Buttars, 
was normal in all respects to and including the time she 
had a heart attack in March, 1951, we desire to briefly 
refer to the testimony of neighbors and friends, who fre-
quently visited with Mrs. Buttars from the years 1940 to 
1951. 
Vivian Clark, a neighbor, ( R. 277) testified that ~1rs. 
Buttars attended his parent's golden wedding. This was 
in 1943. (R. 277). Mrs. Buttars was at the witness' home 
. three times after 1944. Mrs. Buttars read the newspapers, 
discussed current events ( R. 279), and he knew that ~Irs. 
Buttars had been sick, but he noticed between 1944 and 
1947 that she was very alert (R. 280.) 
Donna Sparks, a neighbor (R. 281) testified: Q. 
"Would you say that she was normal for her age? A. Well, 
certainly. I only hope that I can say that I'm as nonnal 
when I'm that age." ( R. 286.) This was at the time the 
will was executed. ( R. 287.) Donna knew of a heart 
spell, but this was in 1951. ( R. 289.) 
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Dr. C. C. Randall ( R. 290) felt she was perfectly 
competent, and that the only time he saw her when she 
was not alert was in March, 1952. ( R. 295.) Prior to 
March, 1952 her mind was always sound. ( R. 296.) 
Annie Thompson ( R. 302) was her Relief Society 
Teacher with whom Mrs. Buttars discussed religious les-
sons-thought she was always alert and enjoyed visiting 
with her (R. 305.) In 1947 these were monthly visits 
(306-7.) 
J. Byron Ravsten (R. 313) lived in Clarkston all his 
life ( 44 years old) and was Bishop of Mrs. Buttars ward, 
knew her all of the years in question, and noticed nothing 
unusual, until shortly before her death. (R. 315.) 
Horace Bowles, (R. 319) was a Watkins Products 
dealer, and had been for twenty-seven years, and had 
called on Mrs. Buttars about every four or five weeks for 
17 years (R. 320.) He did not notice any mental incompe-
tency in his business dealings with her (R. 322. ) "She 
never failed to recognize me. She never failed to recognize 
what I was there for." (R. 323,) and he had continued to 
call on her tilll951. (R. 322.) 
Sylvia Goodey ( R. 326) was another neighbor who 
had lived in Clarkston all her life, and she noticed nothing 
peculiar about Mrs. Buttars ( R. 327-8) as late as 1951. 
Pearl Allen ( R. 339) owns and operates a ladies ready-
to-wear store in Logan, where Mrs. Buttars traded and had 
known Mrs. Allen for 15 years as a customer ( R. 341) and 
Mrs. Buttars traded there all the time, right up to the last 
illness. ( R. 343.) A. "Well I find that Mrs. Buttars was 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
always alert. She knew what she wanted and that was 
it . . . That was true during all these years . . . As long as 
she came into the store she was perfect." ( R. 342. ) 
This resume only includes, friends, neighbors, busi-
iness acquaintances, the Bishop, the Relief Society Tea-
cher, and the Doctor. May we ask why it is that not one 
of such people would say Mrs. Buttars was incompetent, 
and we must assume that if any of the people of Clarkston 
had thought she was incompetent the appellants would 
have produced them. There was not one disinterested 
witness who testified for appellants. 
Herein we shall give a brief summary of the testimony 
of each witness called on behalf of the contestants and 
appellants, who will be referred to hereafter as appellants. 
The entire mass of testimony rendered by these people 
is so replete with evidence of the competency at the time 
of making the will, that the verdict of the jury in answer 
to the first interrogatory is impossible to understand. 
For instance, note the three answers. (R. 16.) All 
the answers are in the negative and it is perfectly con-
ceivable that the jury felt the answer to the first one to 
be in favor of respondent. Otherwise, how can the answers 
to No. 2 and No. 3 be reconciled with that of No. 1? If, in 
fact no such fraud or undue influence existed at time will 
was exevuted, the mother must have acted on her own ini-
tiative in dictating the terms of the will. We will briefly 
refer to the testimony of each witness produced by appel-
. lants to indicate the reasons back of the testimony and to 
show that the only reason for the contest was a dissap-
pointment in the terms of the will. 
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As a preliminary thereto, however, we will state that 
Dan Buttars was a deceased son of Emma G. Buttars, the 
testatrix. In the will ( R. 5) the testatrix specially men-
tioned them, but because she had loaned money to her 
son Dan, their father, which had not been repaid she felt 
he had received a just proportion of her estate. It is 
interesting to note at this point ( R. 37) that Mrs. Buttars 
gave Attorney Newel G. Daines instrutcions about the 
terms of her will, and there was no one present at the 
time to help, or to guide her, and he drew the will 
solely from her instructions. She had walked to the second . 
story floor of the Cache Valley Bank Building - long 
I 
and arduous steps for a person claimed to be feeble in 
mind and body. (R.38.) 
Villa Bronson, granddaughter and a contestant, testi-
fied that Mrs. Buttars was not as mentally alert as she was 
before her illness ( R. 63); and that she was not as keen as 
she used to be; but here witness was talking about a time 
two weeks before the death of testatrix, or seven years after 
the will was made. Witness testified that on Easter, 1945, 
two or three weeks after date of will, she visited her grand-
mother, and that she was keeping her own home, was a 
good housekeeper, and that she kept house in a neat and 
tidy manner; that testatrix had remembered the exact 
number of Dan's children though some first names were 
misspelled. 
Ted Buttars, grandson and contestant, testified that 
he had been on a mission for the Mormon Church for 
some years (R. 85) and upon his return he was called into 
the navy in 1944, and returned in 1946. ( R. 86. ) Her 
memory probably wasn't as good as it was then ( R. 87.) 
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It is very important to note Ted's testimony about his 
grandmother, when comparing her in 1946 to that of 1940. 
"She had been sick longer, and naturally she was older and 
more feeble, and I introduced her to my wife and she told 
me she was glad that we were married and so forth. But 
there was no definite conversation on any one thing. Just 
like natural acquaintances would talk about." Some com-
plaint was made all through the testimony of these grand-
children that she sometimes failed to recognize them. Ted 
testified that his grandmother had 44 or 45 living grand-
children, 78 living great grandchildren, or a total of 122 
grand and great grandchildren ( R. 89,) and yet the fact 
that Mrs. Buttars sometimes failed to recollect some of 
their names and family connections, is given as a reason 
for her failing memory. We submit this to be a preposter-
ous ~contention, and we will later show in this summary 
that not once did she ever fail to recognize her own im-
mediate sons and daughters, and we call the further at-
tention of the court that the will was made during war 
time, when most younger people were engaged in much 
travel about the world, and conditions were much un-
settled to the minds of even the most astute people. 
Ted believed his grandmother incompetent to make 
a will because she was 80 years old ( R. 91,) but if Mrs. 
Buttars actually went to Mr. Daines office, gave him the 
information to make the will, without a memorandum, that 
she was comparable to any person he had ever seen eighty 
years of age. ( R. 92. ) 
Orner Buttars, grandson and contestant, testified that 
he belived his Grandmother incompetent because - "I 
believe if she had been sound and capable of making a 
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will that involved as much property and all as her estate 
did, I don't believe she would have left us out like she 
did." ( R. 108.) This witness was not so much concerned 
with mental capacity as he was at the disappointment he 
and his brothers and sisters had experienced, because he 
testified (R. 111-112.) "The reason we're in court con-
testing the will is that we don't think if she was sound in 
her mind and able to dispose of her property, that she 
would have cancelled off what little indebtedness she had 
at one time with my father, and then in the next paragraph 
in the will turn around and give the rest of ~m six or 
eight thousand dollars apiece. Q. And that 's.,._reason you 
don't think she was competent? A. That's right." 
Wendell Buttars, grandson and contestant: This wit-
ness was in the military service between the dates of Feb-
raury 20, 1941 and April 15, 1945. ( R. 120. ) He gave 
as some of his reasons for his grandmother's incapacity 
that she did not "break down" at his father's funeral some 
weeks previously, and yet he would not contend that she 
was insane. ( R. 124.) He stated that she always re.cog-
nized the people who had been with her, and it was the 
people who had been away three· or four years that con-
fused her. (R. 127. )Then he was asked: Q. "I want 
you to tell the jury one case, if you know of, when you 
were there when she failed to recognize her sons and 
daughters. A. No." 
Maybell Griffiths, daughter: This is a very interesting 
witness. She stated that when her Mother was sick in 
1944 (we claim that this sickness was 1946 -later shown), 
that there was not as great a difference as in the 1940 sick-
ness. R. 236-7.) She was asked if her mother had a sound 
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a~d disposing mind and memory, and she answered, "Well, 
not to handle any amount of money." ( R. 244.) Then 
she gave the reason ~hy she wants the jury to find her 
mother incompetent to make a will. ( R. 251.) Q. "Isn't 
it a fact that in that petition all you ask the court to do 
is appoint your brother Melvin as administrator? That's 
all you ask in that, isn't it? A. Well, that's fine." She 
was.one of the petitioners to have her brother Melvin made 
Administrator-will annexed, to the same will she now 
questions. She wanted two things - that Melvin and not 
Wallace be executor, and she wanted Dan's sons and 
daughters to share in the estate. ( . 252-3. ) She wants 
the will probated, and she knows that if Melvin could be 
the executor of it, it "would be swell with her." ( R. 253.) 
Margaret Jardine, daughter: She testified that her 
mother accused people of taking things, laying them away 
and that she did things "all older people do as they get 
older." (R. 260.) She said her mother at no time after 
1942 or 1943 had sufficient mentality to dispose of her pro-
perty by will ( R. 282,) but then she said: Q. "And your 
mother was simply a person normal for the age of eighty 
years; isn't that right? A. Oh, usual. ( R. 264.) And 
then became one of the signers to the petition which 
prayed to admit her mother's will to probate, but to have 
her brother Melvin administrator of the estate with will 
annexed. (R. 264.) "Q. Do you know what you signed 
when you siged this? A. Papers. Q. It was a petition, 
wasn't it, and you wanted this court to probate your 
mother's will, didn't you? A. ·Yes." (R. 265.) 
Melvin H. Buttars, son of testatrix: This witness was 
given a free rein to show his mother to be incompetent 
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and said. ( R. 179. ) "Well as tim~ went on her memory 
wasn't so good." He would not set a date when he felt his 
mother was incompetent. ( R. 180.) He testified that his 
mother was neither physically nor mentally able to make 
a will between 1940 and 1952, the date of her death, yet 
he did not know that she had made a will until 1950. 
(R. 184.) And this witness filed two cross-petitions; in the 
same proceedings, and same court, to have the same will 
admitted to probate. ( R. 204. ) The following quotation 
from the cross-examination will indicate to the court why 
the lower court set aside the verdict of the jury: Q. (read-
ing from the petition which the witness signed) "I'll read 
it to him, 'Being of the age of abou~ eighty years and being 
of sound and disposing mind and memory and not acting 
under duress or undue influence from any person or per-
sons whosoever,. do make, publish, and declare this to be 
my last will and testament.' Did you sign asking the court 
to probate that will? A. I signed a petition asking to 
probate it? Q. Yes. A. No, I didn't sign a petition asking 
to probate it. Q. _I refer you to petitioners' prayer-and 
one of them is you, right there-for letters testamentary. 
Do you know what that means? A .. It means testifying, I 
guess. . Q. 'And that said will be admitted to probate.' 
That's exactly the one you're asking the jury now to deny 
probate because your mother was in~ompetent. And that 
letters be issued to you, Melvin. Am I right or wrong? 
A. You're right. Q. You're positive I'm right, aren't you? 
And you alleged it oil the theory your mother was com-
petent at the time she made the will, didn't you? The sub-
stance of that is that you allege to this court and repre-
sented under oath sworn to before a notary public, Judge 
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Harris, that your mother was competent at the time she 
made that will, did you not? A. It's on there, yes." 
(R. 205.) 
This witness shows the extent that he will go to gain 
his own ends, i.e. to have a jury determine his mother in-
competent. "Q. This is the document (referring to the 
petition this witness and two sisters signed) alleging to 
this court your mother$ was ~ompetent to make a will, and 
you presented it for probate. Examine it and see if I'm 
correct. (Examines the petition to make him the Admin-
istrator with will annexed - same will.) A. I signed it, 
yes, if that's what's in there .... Q. And y9u ask the court 
that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of 
administration with will annexed be issued to Melvin H. 
Buttars (the witness,) and you thereupon represented to 
this court that your mother was of· sound and disposing 
mind on the day she made the will, did you not? A. Thafs 
what's in them documents I signed." (R. 205-6.) 
He testified that his mother did business after the 
' 
sickness of 1940 as she did before, and in fact right up to 
her death. ( R. 222. ) He says: "As far as the signatures 
and the checks being wrote out, yes. She signed all of her 
checks up until the last while of her life." (R. 222.) 
The ·character of the evidence of contestants is all the 
same and on the other hand, Doctor Randall who attended 
her for years, and all of the witnesses for proponent testi-
fied as to her mental ability. We remark with the Su-
preme Court. of California in the case of Dobrzensky's 
Estate, 232 P. 2d. 886, that "While it is not determinative, 
nevertheless it is remarkable that in this case no intimate 
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acquaintance nor qualified physician, not even respondent, 
saw fit to testify that in his or her opinion the decedent 
lacked testamentary capacity. This case appears to be 
another example of a jury finding a testator incompetent 
because the jury did not like what was done" .... "It has 
been held over and over in this state that old age, feeble-
ness, forgetfulness, filthy personal habits, personal eccen-
tricities, failure to recognize aid friends or relatives, physi-
cal disability, absentmindedness and mental confusion, {if 
present only to a limited degree) do not furnish grounds 
for holding that a testator lacked testamentary capacity.', 
Our search for cases where juries have held the testa-
tor incompetent mentally, and the appellate courts either 
reversed the verdict of the jury, or sustained the lower 
court in setting aside the verdict of the jury, results in some 
interesting cases outside of Utah. In Re Lingenfelter's 
Estate (Cal.) 241 P. 2d. 990. There the facts were long 
and witnesses testified that the testatrix was not of suffic-
ient mental capacity to make a will, but based their opinion 
on facts similar to those we have such as an unstable mind. 
In our case some of the contestants had been away be-
tween 1940 and 1945 and 1946 as outlined above. The 
California Court said: 
"Accepting that construction of the evidence most 
favorable to Lenore, it shows no lack of testamentary 
capacity at the time of the execution of the will pre-
sented for probate. There is testimony concerning 
isolated acts, foibles, idiosyncracies, mental irregular-
ities or departures from normal which do not bear 
directly upon and influence the testamentary act. But 
much more than that is required to set aside bequests 
of property. The actual mental condition of the de-
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cedent at the time of the execution of the will is the 
question to be determined upon a contest based on his 
alleged incompetency, and evidence tending to show 
unsoundness of mind either before or after the execu-
tion of the will is important only in so far as it tends 
to show mental condition at the time of the execution 
of the will . . . . To overcome the presumption of san-
ity, the contestant must show affirmatively and by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the testator was 
of unsound mind at the time he executed his will .... 
The acts which led certain witnesses to express the 
. opinion that she was of unsound mind had no bearing 
upon her testimentary capacity. (Italics supplied.) 
As in our case the California will was attacked because 
of an unnatural disposition of property, or disposition 
which ,contestants. claimed testatrix would not have made 
had she been of sound mind, noting further: 
But, when mental incapacity is the ground of attack, 
the dispository clauses of the will are not, in and of 
themselves, . evidence of mental incapacity which 
would overcome the presumption of sanity and com-
petence." 
The Arizona case of In Re Greene's Estate, 11 P. 2d. 
947, is a very enlighte~.ing and important case where the 
issues were incompetence and undue influence. The action 
to deny probate of the will was entered by the wife, and 
several witnesses testifed that the testator was incompe-
tent. The trial court found the testator incompetent, but 
made no finding as to undue influence. In our case n1uch 
stress is placed on the fact that the family of Mrs. Buttars 
considered the appointment of a guardian. Such was the 
consideration in the Arizona case: 
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"From the date of the an1putation onward during 
the months of February and March, testator was de-
lerous at times and admittedly during that period had 
various mental delusions. On the other hand, during 
most of that tin1e he was apparently perfectly normal 
mentally. The strain of caring for him was great, both 
physically and financially, and his family and friends 
seriously considered attempt,ing to have him commit-
ted to the state hospital for the insane, but, as he im-
proved, abandoned the idea.,, (Italics supplied.) 
It will be recalled that Mrs. Allen, a Logan store 
owner transacted business with Mrs. Buttars almost up to 
the time of her death in 1952, seven years after the will. 
And the bank statements, both savings and checking, dis-
closed that Mrs. Buttars was managing her property and 
depositing the income in the bank to and including the 
year 1951, or within approximately six months of her 
demise. The Arizona case had this to say: 
"On the contrary, it (evidence) is overwhelming 
to the effect that except during certain times in the 
months of January, February and March, when he was 
suffering great pain and worried over his physcial 
condition, his mental capacity was good. He tran-
sacted considerable general business during and after 
this period, and the persons who did business with 
him stated that he displayed a full understanding of 
what he was doing. Even the witnesses for appellee 
admitted that most of the time he appeared perfectly 
competent. They based their testimony that in their 
belief he was not mentally competent to make a will 
principally on the fact that he unquestionably suffered 
from certain delusions during- and shortly after his 
confinement to his bed .... The rule is that even 
though a testator does suffer from delusions or halluci-
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nations unless the will itself was a creature or product 
of such delusions or hallucinations it is not invalid." 
Contestants in case at bar make much of the matter 
concerning the fact of whether or not testatrix mistakenlv 
thought her deceased son Dan owed her money. On ibis 
point, the Arizona case said: 
"The testator may have been mistaken in the con-
clusions which he drew from his wife's conduct; but 
those conclusions were not so unwarranted, especially 
in view of the fact that the property in question was 
all accumulated by him before the marriage, that we 
can say that they show he was mentally incompetent 
to make a ·will. Nor is a court concerned with the 
abstract justice or injustice of a will." (Italics sup· 
plied.)- · 
In the Colorado case of In Re Holmes' Estate, 56 
P. 2d. 1333, the court held that where the testator mis-
takenly believed that hfs sister was dead and therefore, 
made no provision for her, 'Yas not sufficient to invalidate 
the will. The court reversed the lower court because it 
was a jury question as to whether the belief of the demise 
of- testator's sister was ·induced by fraud or other benefic-
iaries. Sane people are continually in the courts under the 
mistaken belief that others owe them money, and a verdict 
for defendant in such cases is no indication that the plain-
tiff is insane. We ask counsel for contestants to cite a 
case, where the mistaken belief was not induced by fraud 
sustaining his· position in this respect. 
A very important -case is found from California in Re 
Smethurst's Estate, UP. 2d. 830. The procedural matters 
were exactly like this appeal. In the California case, the 
jury found that the testator was insane at the time of the 
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execution of the \vill, and the lower court entered a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury. The Su-
preme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court 
after a revie\v of the evidence saying: 
"If the motion for a directed verdict is made at the 
conclusion of plaintiff's case, the court cannot, of 
course, go beyond the evidence then before the court, 
but if the motion is made at the close of defendant's 
case, the court can review the entire record within the 
limitations imposed by law'' .... "Also there need 
not be and absence of conflict in the evidence, for, to 
deprive the court of the right to exercis,e this power, 
there must be a substanial conflict, and that presup-
poses at least a comparison of the substance of the 
conflicting testimony of contestants and proponents." 
( Italicts supplied.) 
In that case some of the witnesses considered and 
testified to the fact that testator was. insane at all times: 
"It was testified he frequently drank to excess, and 
several of the witnesses testified they considered him 
insane. A few considered him insane at all times, but 
most of them considered him insane only when drink-
ing, and when not under the influence of liquor they 
declared their opinion to be· he was sane. The con-
ception of most of these witnesses as to what consti-
tuted insanity was vague and uncertain." 
Upon the authority of that case we desire to direct 
the attention of the court to the fact, as pointed out in our 
review of contestant's testimony, that the witness Orner 
Buttars, testified his grandmother, Mrs. Buttars, was in-
co~petent because she did riot make provision for the 
children ·of Dan Buttars. 
. . 
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In re Putnam's Estate, (Cal.) 34 P. 2d. 148: 
In the matter of the estate of Adam Putnam, deceased, 
will contest by his son W. M. Putnam, opposed by the 
Wells Fargo Bank, etc. and other proponents. From a 
judgment for contestant entered on jury's verdict and from 
an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict, proponents appealed. 
The evidence disclosed that he left an estate of about 
$300,000. He devised and bequeathed to his executor, in 
trust, his entire estate. He was divorced from his wife, 
and left surviving daughter Edna, and a son W. M. Put-
nam, to whom he left monthly bequests of $500.00, and 
$250.00, respectively. His son filed an opposition to pro-
bate of his will. The testator died at the age of 82. It was 
charged that he used intoxicating liquor daily during the 
latter 40 years of his life which resulted in his insanity, and 
that because of liquors, testator had become so weakened 
in his physical and mental powers that he was incapable of 
testamentary act. The jury found that decedent was not of 
sound and disposing mind when the will and codicil were 
executed. The proponents moved for judgment nothwith-
standing the verdict which was denied. A motion for new 
trial was denied. 
Upon appeal the judgment of trial court was reversed. 
In stating the contention of the contestant, the appellate 
court said: 
"The contestant insists that the testator was pos-
sessed of an insane delusion which he described as an 
unexplained, intense, and unwarranted hatred and 
hositilty toward his wife and her blood relatives, par-
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ticularly the contestant; and unfounded and fixed be-
lief that his children were worthless and inco1npetent; 
that they had "too n1uch Johnston, and that they had 
no Putnam blood in them; an unfounded and fixed 
belief that whoever might marry his children had de-
signs only on the testator's property and were awaiting 
his death to get hold of it; an unwarranted, un-
founded, and fixed belief that his children were 
spendthrifts and would dissipate and squander his 
estate within three years after his death and become 
public charges.'' 
In conclud•ing that the testator possessed testmen-
tary capacity to make the will in question, it held: 
"The only reasonable conclusion from the record 
before us is that the testator was possessed of a par-
ental belief, not abnormal or unfounded under the 
facts, relating to his son's ability to handle money, and 
that he took steps to protect him with an income ade-
quate to his needs in addition to his own earnings for 
the balance of his life. Even though there may have 
been discard in the family during the decedent's life-
time or even injustice in the division of income be-
tween the children, that alone would not be sufficient 
to set aside a will executed by one in full possession 
of his mental faculties and otherwise competent to 
make a will." 
In the Montana case of In re Benson's Estate, 98 P.2d. 
868, the undisputed evidence discloses that Benson was 
taken to hospital on Wednesday, February 2, 1938, suffer-
ing from diabetes mellitus and left lobar pneumonia, from 
which illness he died at 8:45 a. m., Sunday, February 6, 
1938. At time of his death he was 71 years of age. At his 
request a will was prepared on Sat:urday evening, February 
5th about 12 hours prior to his death. When his will was 
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offered for probate, the executor named therein submitted 
proof in support of the allegations of his petition. Contest 
having theretofore been filed, the case was tried before 
the court and a jury. The trial and result thereof is stated 
in the opinion: 
"A jury having been impaneled, the contestants 
submitted evidence in support of their contest, and at 
the conclusion of all evidence the court submitted a 
single interrogatory to the jury, as follows: Was John 
A. Benson competent to make a last will and testament 
at the time of the alleged signing of the instrument 
offered for probate as a will dated February 5, 1938?, 
The jury answered the interrogatory in the negative, 
and thereupgn the· judgment aforesaid was entered." 
In reversing the judgment of trial court, the Supreme 
Court called attention to a fundamental rule, viz:-
"W e must bear in mind that, in the solution of the 
question here presented, one who contests a will has 
the burden of proof once the allegations of the peti-
tion for probate have been sufficiently proven. In 
re Murphy's Estate, 43 Mont. 353, 116 P. 1004, Ann. 
Cas. 1912C, 389. Also that a testator may dispose of 
his property as he sees fit, and that courts cannot make 
wills fpr persons. In re Silver's Estate, 98 Mont. 141, 
38 P. 2d. 277." (Italics supplied.) 
And the following observation made by the Montana 
Court is applicable to the situation present when Mrs. 
Buttars executed her will: 
"It appears to us that the physical facts surroundi.ng 
the execution of the will and the acts of the testator 
speak louder than the witnesses in supporting the pro-
ponent's contention that the testator was competent. 
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Viewed in the light of the foregoing instructions, and · 
from the evidence offered, it is clear that there is no 
question of incompetency by reason of insanity, or 
senility, or disease prior to the time testator was taken 
to the hospital, and that at the time of the execution 
of the will he had in mind the names of the objects 
of his bounty, and also the character of his property, 
and the manner 4! -which he desired to dispose of it." 
In the case Klose et. al. vs. Collins et. al., 20 P.2d. 494, 
the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed judgment in favor 
of defendants. On appeal, contestants assigned two prin-
cipal errors, viz - "The findings and judgment of the court 
is contrary to the law and evidence," and "The court erred 
in sustaining defendants demurrer to the evidence." 
The grounds upon which plaintiffs seek to set aside 
the will are mental incompetancy of testatrix, undue in-
fluence, and want of independent advice:" 
The testatrix, Hattie Weary, executed a will on August 
4, 1931, at the age of 78. She died on December 1, 1931. 
For several years prior to her death she had been a \Vidow, 
and she had no near relatives. The contestant's were chil-
dren of half brothers and half sisters, who resided in New 
York and Pennsylvania. The defendants are Arthur J. 
Collins and· Glen R. Sewell. They were president and 
cashier, respectively, of the National Bank of -Sebetha, 
where she resided, and who had been friendly and helpful 
to her in the management of her affairs. They were ap-
pointed joint executors by her will. The contestants of-
fered evidence to show that she had relied entirely upon 
the defendants in her business and personal transactions, 
since the death of her husband some seven years prior to 
her demise. 
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The trial,court held that the evidence of plaintiffs was 
not sufficient to prove mental incompetency of testatrix 
or that undue influnence or fraud had been exercised upon 
her. 
In affirming judgment of lower court, the Supreme 
Court of Kansas referred to a well known rule which is 
followed in evaluating the evidence in a will contest: 
rule: 
"In order to possess the mental capacity to make a 
valid will the law, based upon the experience of man-
· kind and common sense, does not require that the 
testator possess the ability to manage or carry on a 
c'omplicated business · enterprise. If necessary the 
mental capacity to know what property he has, and is 
able to make a disposition of his property with under-
standing reason, knows the persons and objects of his 
bounty, and their condition and relationship to him-
self, and is ·able to dictate the items of the will him-
self, this is sufficient.' Higbee v. Bloom, 108 Kan. 
723 733, 196 P. 1080, 1084." 
The court also called attention to another well known 
" 'The settled rule in this state is that one who is able 
to understand what property he has and how he wants 
it to go at his· death, is competent to make a will even 
though& he may be feeble in mind and descrepit in 
body.' Cole v. Drum, 109 Kan. 148, syl. par. 6, 197 
P. 1105, 1106. See also, Risel v. McPhersol) County, 
122 Kan. 741, 253 P. 586; Hoff v. Hoff, 106 Kan. 542, 
189 P. 613; and Wisner v. Chandler, 95 Kan. 36, 147 
P. 849." 
In weighing the evidence the court said: 
"There is no evidence here to indicate that the busi-
ness relationship these two defendants had with the 
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testatrix ever reached the state of being such as might 
properly be termed confidential, nor the influence 
they may have had with her or over her being unduly 
used, in the making of the will or in other matters." 
And then the court concluded: 
"We conclude that the showing of mental incapac-
ity was not sufficient under all the facts and circum-
stances to require the setting aside of the will on that 
account." 
It is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court 
of Oregon in a recent case, In re Scott"s Estate, 228 P.2d. 
417, laid down a salutary rule: 
"The last will and testament of a deceased persqn 
is an instrument of such great solemnity; that it will 
never be set aside unless the evidence is convincing 
that it should be." 
In re Peterknis Estate (Cal. ) 73 P2d. 897, the facts 
are stated as follows: 
"Under his will, dated May 12, 1931, with an holo-
graphic codicil dated September 23, 1933, he left his 
property to a sister, a cousin, seven nephe~s, five 
nieces, and four children of nephews and nieces. The 
will and codicil were admitted to probate on Decem-
ber 6, 1935. A petition to revoke the proba~e of said 
will was filed by the three sons and three daughters 
of the deceased upon the ground that on May 12, 
1931, and for at least a year before and at all times 
subsequent thereto he was of unsound mind and in-
competent to make a will, and upon the further 
ground that throughout said time he was in declining 
health and in an enfeebled mental condition; that he 
was suffering from delusions that his said children 
did not care for him, that they wanted him to die in 
order to get his property, that they were conspiring 
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to make his home. life unhappy, and that they were 
unfairly siding with their mother in the domestic dif-
fer~nces which had arisen; that said delusions grew 
until they became a monomania which existed at the 
time of the signing of said will and codicil and up to 
the time of his death; and that said delusions were 
the controlling mental factors governing the making 
of said will and codicil." 
The trial was had before a court and jury. At the 
conclusion of contestants evidence, a motion for non-suit 
was granted. The Supreme Court posed the familiar rule: 
"Under familiar rules the question presented is 
whether, viewed in the light most favorable to appel-
lants, was there any substantial evidence which would 
have supported a judgment in their favor." 
The evidence which is related in the opinion covers 
misconduct of the testator, in his relationship with his 
children whom he disinherited. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The fol-
lowing well known rules were relied upon .in the determi-
nation of mental competancy sufficient to make a valid 
will: 
" 'The law is( well settled in this state that a 'testa-
tor is of sound and disposing mind and memory, if, at 
the t~e of making his will he has sufficient mental 
capacity to be able to understand the nature of the 
act he is doing, and to understand and recall the 
nature and situation of his property, and to remember 
and understand his relations to the persons who have 
claims upon his bounty, and whose interests are af-
fected by the provisions of the instrument.' " Estate 
of Bemmerly, 110 Cal. A pp. 550, 294, P. 33, 37." 
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The court also relied upon the following rule: 
" 'Every mental departure from the normal will not 
destroy a testamentary disposition, otherwise valid, 
of the testatrix's estate." " 'Mental derangement suf-
ficient to invalidate a will must be insanity in one of 
t\VO forms: ( 1 ) Insanity of such broad character as 
to establish mental incompetency generally; or. ( 2) 
some specific and narrower form of insanity under 
which the testator is the victim of some hallucination 
or delusion' '' 
The Court did not approve of testator's conduct, but 
nevertheless held such conduct was not evidence of in-
competency. We quote from the opinion: 
''While the evidence indicates that the testator pos-
sessed many qualities which are not admirable, it is 
far from sufficient to show general mental ~com­
petency at the time the will was made or that he did 
not then have sufficient mental capacity to under-
stand what he was doing and to understand and recall 
the nature and situation of his property and his re-
lations to the persons who had a natural claim on his 
bounty." 
In our search for Utah cases, not cited by appellant, 
where this court has passed upon the question of mental 
incompetency of a testator or testatrix, we find In re 
Bryan's Estate, 25 P.2d. 602, and In re LaVelle's Estate, 
248 P.2d. 372 .. 
The facts in the Bryan Estate case show that Bryan 
died at Ogden, August 15, 1929. His will was made on 
August 6, while he was confined in the hospital and im-
mediately after a major operation had been performed. 
He left as his property a bank account of about $8,000.00, 
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which he bequeathed to the St. Joseph's School at Ogden. 
He disinherited an only surviving sister Bertha M. Clinch, 
who resided in the state of Nebraska, and she filed a con-
test, in which she alleged mental incompetancy and undue 
influence. 
The contest was heard before the court, without a 
jury. At the conclusion of the contestant's case, proponent 
.moved for judgment of non-suit, which motion was granted 
and upon appeal judgment was affirmed. 
Although the evidence showed that decedent was a 
verv sick man when he executed the will, the doctor testi-
"' 
fied that his mind was sound and that he could make a will. 
And the trial court and this court so held. We submit that 
the following excerpt taken from the opinion is in point on 
the issue of mental competancy and burden of proof: 
"In the instant case- the burden of proof was on 
contestant to show mental incapacity and undue in-
fluence, and the proponent of the will could meet this 
by proof of a negative, that is, that he did not pro-
cure the execution of the will by undue influence, and 
that the testator was not mentally incapable." 
In a recent decision rendered by this court in re La-
Velle's Estate, 248 P.2d. 372, an interesting question is 
raised which is present in the case at bar. In that case 
testatrix lived for more than a year after the will was 
executed, and in the case at bar Mrs. Buttars lived seven 
years and three months. In considering the claim of con-
testants that Lucille La Velie was incompetent at tin1e she 
executed her will, this court said: 
"There is another aspect of the case which is 
strongly persuasive that this third testament repre-
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sented the will of Lucille Lavelle: It is indisputable 
that after its execution she lived for a vear: about six 
months in Odgen and about six n1onths in the Holla-
day rest home; during this time she had communica-
tion with others but made no effort to revoke the will 
or to make another. There is no evidence and no 
finding that she was incompetent at any time after 
the will's execution; and no reason appears why she 
did not have ample opportunity to change it if it had 
not conformed to her desires. As a matter of fact, 
there is no indication that she ever expressed any dis-
satisfaction with it." 
The evidence in case at bar discloses that Mrs. Buttars 
actively kept account of her income from the property, 
real and personal, after executing her will. The bank 
statements show that she deposited large sums of money 
each year. She renewed a lease in 1948. During the 
seven yea~s and three months the Buttars will remained 
in Attorney Daines office, so Mrs. Buttars had ample op-
portunity during that period, to make a new will or change 
the will, she made in March 22, 1945. Yes, Mrs. Buttars 
had ample opportunity to change the will, and as was 
stated by this court in the LaVelle decision - "there is no 
indication that she ever expressed any dissatisfaction with 
it." 
Point 11. The sole point raised by appellants on this 
appeal is that the verdict of the jury was supported by 
substantial competent evidence, and all legitimate infer-
ences deducible therefrom, of lack of testamentary capac-
ity on the part of the deceased at the time of the execution 
of the will in question and because thereof the lower court 
usurped the function of the jury in rendering judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
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In support of his contention counsel cites and relies 
upon In re Alexander's Estate, 139 P .2d. 432, and In re 
Dong Ling Hing' s Estate, 2 P .2d. 902, to the effect that a 
will contest is an action at law, and hence the court cannot 
weigh and pass upon conflicting evidence, or pass on the 
credibility of witnesses. · 
There was no conflict in the evidence In re Alexand-
er's Estate, supra. The evidence showed without dispute-
" that the will was not signed by the testatrix in the pres-
ence of one of the subscribing witnesses." The witness 
testified - "No. I was not present when she signed it," and 
"I did not see her sign it." On that testimony, which was 
not in conflict, the court refused to admit the will to pro-
bate. The undisputed facts in the Alexander Estate, supra, 
cannot be compared with the undisputed evidence in the 
case at bar, since in the case at bar both subscribing wit-
nesses appeared in court and testified that Mrs. Buttars, 
signed the will in their presence and at her request and 
in her presence and in the presence of each other, they 
subscribed their names to said will as witnesses, in fact, 
their testimony showed that all of the statutory require-
ments in the execution of the will were complied with. 
In re Dong Ling Hing' s Estate, 2 P .2d. 902, as stated 
in the opinion - "The ~chief issue before the court is the 
validity of the purported will, whether it was duly and 
lawfully executed and published by deceased, and duly 
attested by the subscribing witnesses." It appeared from 
the evidence adduced at the trial in that case, as reported 
in the opinion, that one of the subscribing witnesses when 
shown the purported will some time prior to the trial said-
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"I didn't sign it." "No, that is not my signature." And 
when the other subscribing witness was contacted and he 
examined the purported will he likewise denied that he 
signed the document in question as a will, and that he did 
not sign it in the presence of the testator or the other 
witness. (2P.2d. 907 - 1st Column.) This testimony 
seemed to be undisputed. 
The case of Galorowidz v. Ward, et al. 230 P.2d. 576 is 
cited by appellant in an attempt to show that the instant 
action, being one at law, the court cannot weigh and pass 
upon conflicting evidence. That case did not involve a will 
contest but a suit for damages resulting from an automobile 
accident. Galorowidz sued Robert Ward, a minor, his par-
ents John M. Ward, and Mrs. John M. Ward, Max Siegel, 
and others. At the time of the accident Robert Ward was 
operating a car, the property of Seigel, who was the em-
ployer of John M. Ward. There was no dispute in the 
evidence relative to ownership of the car. It was con-
ceded that Robert Ward, was at the time of the accident 
operating a car belonging to Siegel, but he was not Siegel's 
employee. Thus there was no conflicting evidence in that 
case on question of agency. 
Since the contestant's did not call a physician to testify 
concerning Mrs. Buttars condition of health at the time the 
will was executed, there is an attempt on the part of ap-
pellants counsel to discredit the testimony of Dr. C. C. 
Randall, who testified that he had been her attending 
physician from the year 1934 to the time of her death 
which occurred on July 1st, 1952. He testified that with 
the exception of two occasions, the first in 1940, when she 
was confined i!l the hospital suffering from pneumonia, 
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and again in the year 1946, when she was again taken to 
the hospital for a short period suffering from a similar 
cause, her mental condition was normal for a woman of her 
age to and including March 1st, 1952. ( R. 291-296.) Dr. 
Randall testified that her health and mental condition was 
normal during the year 1945, when she executed her will. 
(R. 260.) . 
On page nine of brief, appellant's counsel propounds 
the query? "Was the jury's verdict that the deceased 
lacked testamentary capacity at. time will was executed, 
supported by substantial competent evidence?" The ans-
wer is definitely - No. Their verdict is contrary to the 
testimony of the two subscribing witnesses who testified 
that decedent furnished the information for the will, gave 
them the names of her children, and grandchildren, and 
stated why she desired to limit the childrent of Dan But-
tars, a deceased son to $1.00 each. They testified that she 
declared it to be her last will and she signed it in their 
presences and they signed as attesting witnesses at her 
request, and in her presence and in the presence of each 
other. And the evidence shows that she took an active 
part in the management of her farm property each year 
after the date of will, until about March 1, 1952. 
Counsel has cited the case In re Swan's Estate, 51 
Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, and contends that the Swan case is 
distinguishable from the case at bar. As a matter of fact 
the two cases are very similar in one or more important 
points, as the following review of the evidence in that case 
will show: Mr. Swan was a businessman of considerable 
wealth. He was 83 years of age when his will was exe-
cuted. He was then suffering and, for a number of :·cars 
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had been suffering from hardening of the arteries and with 
some disease of the kidneys, and at times he had spells of 
unsciousness lasting several hours at a time; that these 
spells occurred about a month apart, and at times oftener. 
That when the spells were over his mind was usually clear. 
That he continued to transact business such as collecting 
his rents, and depositing the money in the bank. Mr. 
Swan wrote the terms of the will in long hand and then 
had it typed in proper form. He then signed the will in 
the presence of two of his business associates. 
~1r. Swan intentionlly omitted Maude A. Blackford, 
a granddaughter from his will because he had previously 
given her all the property he intended to bestow upon her. 
She filed objections to the admission of said will to pro-
bate. She alleged that at the time will was executed, Swan 
was not of sound and disposing mind. That he was unduly 
influenced and was prejudiced against her. That the will 
was procured by fraud, circumvention and undue influ-
ence, practiced upon the deceased by his son Ulysses G. 
Swan, or someone in his behalf. That the will was not 
executed in the manner and form required by law. At 
trial contestant contended that when Swan executed the 
will he was suffering from senile dementia and for that and 
other reasons the will cannot be permitted to stand. 
The Swan will was attested by two of _his friends. 
Both witnesses testified to the execution of the will. The 
court said that their testimony constitutes a prima facie 
case in favor of the testators mental capacity, and his will 
was admitted to probate and, on appeal the judgment of 
trial court was affirmed. It is respectfully submitted that 
the decision in the Swan case supports the trial courts 
decision in case at bar. 
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To support his contention that non-expert witness.es 
are competent in cases of this kind, he cites In re McCoy's 
Estate, (Utah) 63 P.2d. 622; In re Hansen's Estate, 52 
P.2d. 1103 and In re Swan's Estate. Respondent has no 
quarrel with the contention that non-expert witnesses are 
competent in cases of this kind, in fact in the instant case 
proponent's called ten such witnesses. 
However, the decision rendered by this court in re 
McCoy's Estate supra, is based upon defects appearing in 
the execution of the will. The facts in that case reveal that 
Mrs. McCoy was 92 years of age, was in a very weak and 
feeble condition when certain of her relatives attempted 
to have her execute a will. There was a serious question 
whether she would have executed a will had she been in 
normal state of health. And moreover, the trial court 
found, based upon the testimony of the subscribing wit-
nesses to her purported will, that they did not sign it at 
her request, but signed it at the request of Attorney 
Cooper, who prepared the will. The evidence in that 
case disclosed that Mrs. McCoy was in a very sick and 
weakened condition, and was not conscious of the fact that 
a will was being made. She passed away one week after 
the purported will was made. 
In re Hansen's ·Estate, 52 P.2d. 1103, trial was had 
before. the court. The trial court found for the protestant, 
and concluded that proponent had procured the instnt-
ment wholly by pursuasion, inducement, fraud, and undue 
influence; found the purported will null and void, and 
refused to admit the same to probate. The evidence dis-
closed that the testatrix was a cripple, resulting fron1 
spinal meningitis. That she was abnormal in her actions, 
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conduct, and outlook on life. The proponent of the will 
prepared it and induced her to sign it in his apartment, at 
night. The witnesses which he selected were not ac-
quainted with the testatrix. Although the testatrix's men-
tal and physical condition was extremely abnormal and 
weak, the court said; "The answer he gave that she was 
not normal does not necessarily imply that she was incom-
petent to make a will. In that case, the court found that 
fraud, undue influence and duress · had been practi~ed 
upon Miss Hansen. In the case at bar the jury found that 
no fraud, duress or undue influence had been practiced 
upon Mrs. Buttars. 
Counsel contends, page 20 of appellants' brief, that 
Mrs. Buttars was incompetent because subsequently to 
the execution of the will, she transferred a portion of her 
real property and some stocks, and purchased some war 
bonds in the names of Wallace, Archulius and Hattie, the 
three younger children, when the will provided that she 
would give the nine living childrent equal shares. 
The will did not describe any property and of course 
could effect only the property, real and personal, owned 
by Mrs. Buttars at the time of her demise, which was con- I 
servatively valued at.slightly under $40,000.00 ( R. 1-6.) 
The fact that she retained a life estate in the deeds to 
Wallace and Archulius, from which she received one-half 
of crops grown on said lands until her demis~, indicates 
that she possessed keen business a·cumen. And as a result 
of this provision the income which she had enjoyed prior 
to date of these deeds was not diminished but remaince,l 
intact, and accounted in part, for the large bank accounts 
which she left at her demise. ( R. 2.) 
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From appellants' attitude as reflected in the latter 
portion of their brief, the re~der would be led to believe, 
that because Mrs. Buttars had made a will, that she would 
thereafter be estopped from disposing of some of her pro-
perty. Counsel in referring to the aforementioned deeds 
etc., called it an unnatural disposition of her property. But 
he does not refer the reader to any statute or case which 
provides or holds that a person can not freely and volun-
tarily dispose of his or her property. But she had a reason 
for her action viz., that she wanted to give the three 
younger children this property to equalize the value of 
property which she and her husband had given to the 
older children prior to their father's demise. (R. 384.) 
It is submitted that the matter mentioned by counsel 
from pages 17 to conclusion of brief are immaterial. The 
law afforded to testatrix the right to make exceptions in 
her will. She explained her reason for limiting her de-
ceased son's children to $1.00 each. No doubt she reas-
oned that inasmuch as her deceased son Dan had not 
paid his debt to her, his estate would be enhanced to that 
extent, and his children would receive that increase. 
l\'or the foregoing reason proponent and respondent 
respectfully submits that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed, with cost. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. E. NELSON 
GEORGE D. PRESTON 
Attorneys for Proponent 
and Respondent. 
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